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the state registry was not complete, therefore the court lacked
jurisdiction pursuant to the exhaustion rule. The exhaustion rule
deprives a court of jurisdiction if a plaintiff has not pursued all
available remedies in the administrative process. The court dismissed
the doctrine and stated Koch's only remedy for TNRCC's violation of
Texas statute existed in not in administrative but in judicial
proceedings. The court held the exhaustion rule did not preclude
jurisdiction.
TNRCC's final attempt to support lack of subject matter
jurisdiction rested upon the mootness doctrine. It alleged Koch's
petition, asking the court to order TNRCC to consider listing the
contaminated area on the state registry, was moot because TNRCC was
considering Koch's request. The court explained the mootness
doctrine prohibits a court form exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy no longer in existence, and stated Koch's petition alleged
an ongoing controversy in that TNRCC had not made a decision on
the issue in a timely manner. The court held mootness did not
deprive the trial court ofjurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court held the trial court erred in dismissing
Koch's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, it reversed
the decision of the trial court and remanded the action.
Rachel Sobrero
Mendez v. San Benito/Cameron County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 45
S.W.3d 746 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that sovereign immunity denies
citizens standing in a case of flood damage caused by a defective
drainage ditch).
Mendez and several other residents (collectively, "Residents") of
the La Palma subdivision brought this action against Cameron County
Drainage District and San Benito (collectively, "Drainage District")
seeking damages resulting from an ineffective drainage ditch.
On April 5, 1991, an extremely heavy rain fell in San Benito and
flooded the La Palma subdivision.
The flooding affected
approximately 700 individuals.
The Residents claimed that the
occurrence of rising water was due to the negligent conduct of the City
of San Benito and Cameron County Drainage District by the design,
placement and maintenance of a drainage ditch. Pursuant to the
Texas Water Code, the Residents claimed that the City of San Benito
and Cameron County Drainage District altered the natural water flow
and diverted impounded surface waters near their homes and
properties. The Residents further asserted that the Drainage District
was negligent in the maintenance and cleaning of its drainage ditches
and other permanent structures. The Drainage District denied the
Residents' allegations and asserted several affirmative defenses
including sovereign immunity.
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Texas law provides that a person whose property is injured by an
overflow of water caused by an unlawful diversion or impounding has
remedies at law and in equity and may recover damages occasioned by
the overflow. Texas law also provides that government units are
generally immune from tort liability except where the legislature has
specifically waived that immunity. In order to prevail against a
government entity, an action must fit into one of the exceptions
provided or it fails as a matter of law.
The Texas Court of Appeals held that because the Residents did
not meet an exception to the defense of sovereign immunity, the
Drainage District was immune from liability as a matter of law.
MichaelBarry

Raburn v. KJI Bluechip Inv., 50 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. App. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment due to inability to establish a duty of
reasonable care in the event of a flash flood that renders a highway
impassible).
While traveling Texas Highway 114, a flash flood swept John and
Janet Raburn's ("Raburns") vehicle off of the highway. At the moment
the vehicle was washed off of the road, it was on a stretch of highway
running through land owned by KJI and leased to Ed and Tom Strader
("Straders").
The Raburns' vehicle quickly became submerged.
Rescuers successfully freed Janet and one of her sons. Janet's other
son, Justin, was swept away in the current, and was later found dead.
In an action for personal injuries and wrongful death, the Raburns
alleged that as owners of the abutting property, KJI and the Straders
had a duty to put into place a system that would safely facilitate the
flow and drainage of water. KJI and the Straders moved for summary
judgment. They alleged the state of Texas had an exclusive, nondelegable duty to control storm and flood waters, and therefore they
were immune from the Raburn's negligence claim. The trial court
granted these motions and the Raburns appealed.
The applicable legal standard is such that if at least one element of
the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment. Evidence in summary judgment
motions must be reflected in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If the non-moving party can establish more than a
scintilla of probative evidence that there is a genuine issue of material
fact, then a no evidence summary judgment is improper. To establish
more than a scintilla of evidence, the nonmovant's evidence must
enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach different
conclusions. A scintilla is not established when evidence only creates a
mere surmise or suspicion of a fact.
On appeal, the Raburns alleged there was a general rule in Texas
that the owner and occupier of land abutting a highway has a duty to

